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1!1e His-Perception of Price and Credit 
Policy in Deve1)ping Country Agriculture: The Case of Costa Rica 
I. Introduction 
Developing countries are frequently perplexed by the failure of seem-
ingly high farm pri,~es and subsidized interest rates to promote agricultural 
output. The stagnaLion of Costa Rican agriculture in the later part of the 
1970s is an excellent example of this problem. A leading Costa Rican econo-
mist, Eduardo Lizano, has documented this stagnation in his recent book, 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Economico, which shows that the growth rate of value 
added in agriculture failed to average even 1 percent annually in the 1973-77 
period while the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged more 
than 5 percent per year over the same period. An important characteristic 
of this stagnation, as Lizano points out, is that it is not concentrated in 
one or two products but rather tends to be spread throughout the agricultural 
sector. In his search for possible causes of this stagnation, Lizano exam-
ines and then dismisses prices and markets, and he also finds no causal rela-
tionship between agricultural production and bank credit. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the impact of price, ex-
change rate and credit policies on the aggregate performance of Costa Rican 
agriculture during the 1970s. It will be argued that Costa Rica, not unlike 
many other developing countries, has pursued price, exchange rate and credit 
policies that adversely affect the performance of the agricultural sector. 
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Agricultural price policy in developing countries often tends to emphasize 
the level of nominal prices rather than real prices, and this becomes par-
ticularly serious jn an inflationary setting where nominal prices are af-
justed with 1 lag. Moreover, domestic prices are rarely compared to inter-
nationa] prices, and when such comparisons are made the appropriateness of 
the exchange rate is seldom considered. Government credit policies for the 
agricultural sector typically focus on preferential low interest rates and 
fail to recognize that credit is fungible and cannot easily be tied to par-
ticular activities. Moreover, in an inflationary setting such interest rate 
policies discourage banks from maintaining the real volume of agricultural 
lending while providing substantial income transfers to a relatively few credit 
recipients. 
The following section examines the output performance during the 1970s of 
twelve of Costa Rica's principle agricultural products (rice, corn, beans, 
sorghum, coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugarcane, beef, milk, hogs and broilers) in 
relation to their real (deflated) prices. The next section compares the 
prices of these products to their international prices, that is, their prices 
in the United States. The next to the last section examines the effects of 
low interest rate bank loans on agricultural output and the relationship of 
output to the real volume of bank credit. The final section summarizes the 
main conclusions of the analysis, and especially the implications for govern-
ment price and credit policies. 
II. Production and Real Domestic Prices 
Two government institutions play a major role in determining prices in 
the agricultural sector. The Consejo Nacional de Produccion (CNP) guarantees 
minimum purchase prices to farmers for basic grains (rice, sorghum, corn and 
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beans) and has monopoly control over imports and exports of these crops as 
well as livestock products. The Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Commercia 
(MEIC) has an important role in controling the retail and wholesale prices of 
food products and in coordinating its price control policy with the CNP's 
price support policy. 
A level of prices high enough to stimulate production while guaranteeing 
consumers an abundant, low-cost supply of food is usually a focus of contro-
versy for institutions that have price control responsibility such as the 
CNP and MEIC. Price setting is even more complex in an inflationary economy 
where the level of nominal prices may be quite different from "real" prices, 
that is, nominal prices adjusted for inflation by some deflator such as that 
for Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although the attention of policymakers is 
often focused on nominal prices, these prices are useless as indicators of 
price incentives in an inflationary economy where a high nominal price may, 
after a time without adjustment, become a low real price that no longer 
provides any incentive to increase production. 
Nominal prices of all twelve agricultural products examined in the pres-
ent study increased significantly during the 1970s, and this may have led 
policymakers to believe that farm prices were adequate. However, when these 
same nominal prices are adjusted for inflation it becomes clear that low real 
farm prices may be an important cause of the stagnation of Costa Rican agri-
culture. Only three of the twelve products (coffee, cocoa and sorghum) had 
higher deflated farm prices at the end of the decade than at the beginning. 
For the other nine products, the deflated farm price was not only lower at 
the end of the decade but also substantially below deflated farm prices in 
the mid-1970s. 
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Declining real farm prices in the 1970s appear to have contributed to 
the stagnation of production for eight of the twelve products studied. Corn, 
bean, hog and poultr·y production have all stagnated as their deflated farm 
prices have declined during the 1970s. Government price policies, accom-
panied by the exchange rate policies to be discussed in the next section, 
appear to be a major cause of the stagnation in beef, milk, banana and sugar 
production. Total slaughter of beef cattle increased only 1 percent annually 
as the deflated farm price decreased by almost 25 percent from the early to 
late 1970s. Milk production also increased at a 1 percent annual rate in 
the late 1970s as tlte deflated farm price decreased to a level below that of 
the early 1970s. Banana production has stagnated at about 1.1 million metric 
tons annually as the deflated farm price declined by about 22 percent from 
the mid to the late 1970s. Sugar production has not kept pace with domestic 
demand so that sug~r exports have declined from over half of production to 
about 35 percent of production in the late 1970s. 
Coffee and cocoa experienced increasing real prices during the 1970s 
and achieved satisfactory rates of increase in production. Sorghum produc-
tion increased at an average annual rate of 30 percent in response to increas-
ing real farm prices until 1977, but since then prices and production have 
declined. Although deflated rice prices have fallen by about 20 percent dur-
ing the 1970s, production has increased at an annual rate of 18 percent, 
partly due to the introduction of higher yielding varieties and a shift in 
rice production toward areas with a more favorable distribution of rainfall. 
A second factor contributing to increased rice production has been the intro-
duction of a highly subsidized crop insurance scheme (premiums paid were 
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equal to only about 20 percent of damages paid) primarily benefiting large 
rice producers (Var~as). 
III. International Price Comparisons 
'ihen the prices of agricultural products in Costa Rica are compared with 
the prices of these same products in other countries, and these comparisons 
are made at the official exchange rate for the Costa Rican colon, Costa Rica 
appears to be noncl1mpetitive in the production of many agricultural products. 
However, using the official Costa Rican exchange rate for such comparisons is 
inappropriate and misleading. Using the official exchange rate is not only 
likely to mislead government officials in setting price policies for the agri-
cultural sector, but also directly affects agricultural output through incen-
tives for producers. If, as is the case in Costa Rica, the official exchange 
rate is overvalued, then revenues received in domestic currency for export 
sales are accordingly reduced, so that the incentives for producers to export, 
or even to produce those products which might be exported, are reduced. 
There are two separate reasons for arguing that the Costa Rican colon is 
overvalued, and each of these must be taken into account independently in ar-
riving at an estimate of the exchange rate that should be used in making inter-
national price comparisons. The first reason is base on traditional purchas-
ing power parity arguments (Officer). In mid-1974 Costa Rica officially de-
valued by unifying its multiple exchange rates at the higher free market rate 
of 8.57 colones per U.S. dollar, and this fixed official rate was maintained 
throughout the rest of the 1970s. From mid-1974 to mid-1979 the Costa Rican 
wholesale price index increased by 81 percent, while the wholesale price in-
dex in the United States, Costa Rica's major trading partner, increased by 
47 percent. Assuming that the official exchange rate adopted in mid-1974 was 
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an equilibrium rate at that time and using the relative changes in wholesale 
prices in Costa Rica and the United States implies that the Costa Rican colon 
was overvalued by 23 percent as of mid-1979. It can further be argued that 
the mid-1974 devaluation was insufficient to remove completely the overvalua-
tion of the colon (Ven at that time, as the large deficit in Costa Rica's 
balance of trade persisted after 1974. 
To this estimate of the overvaluation of the offical exchange rate must 
be added an estimate of the overvaluation due to the structure of protection. 
It is now widely recognized that the protection of import-competing activi-
ties through tariffs and other trade barriers implies negative protection for 
export activities, in part because the domestic currency is valued higher 
vis-a-vis foreign currencies than it otherwise would be.1/ Tariffs and other 
barriers against imports reduce the demand for foreign exchange and thereby 
raise the value of the domestic currency. Estimates of overvaluation due to 
the structure of protection are based on comparing the existing exchange rate 
with estimates of what the exchange rate would be under a regime of free trade. 
This depends, in turn, on estimates of the elasticities of demand for imports 
and of supply and demand for exports together with the rate of tax (or subsidy) 
on exports and the rate of nominal protection for imports (including both 
tariffs and other trade barriers) (Bacha and Taylor). Estimates for Costa Rica 
based on data for 1978 yield an overvaluation due to protection of slightly 
2/ 
more than 20 percent.-
When the official exchange rate is used to compare farm level prices in 
Costa Rica with those in the United States, one set of conclusions is reached 
about the competitiveness and pfficiency of Costa Rican agriculture, but the 
conclusions are strikingly different when the overvaluation of the exchange 
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rate is taken into account. As sho~vn in Table 1, the ratio of Costa Rican 
farm level prices tn U.S. farm level prices at th(! official exchange rate sug-
gests that Costa Rica is more effici~nt than the United States only for beef 
among the eight commodities examined.1/ However, when a 40 percent overvalua-
tion of the official exchange rate is taken into account (which is quite con-
servative given the foregoing estimates) Costa Rica is more efficient in five 
of the eight commodities: rice, milk, pork, and possibly beans, as well as 
beef. Such a dramatic change in the competitive position for these products 
indicates clearly that an overvalued exchange rate can introduce serious dis-
tortions in government price policies and can eliminate price incentjves for 
producers of actual or potential exports. 
Table 1. Comparison of Farm Prices in Costa Rica and the U.S. for 1978-79 
at the Official Exchange Rate and Adjusted for a 40 Percent Over-
Valuation of the Costa Rican Colon 
Commodity 
Rough Rice 
Corn 
Sorghum 
Dry Edible Beans 
Beef 
Milk 
Hogs 
Broilers 
Ratio of Costa Rican Prices to U.S. Farm Prices 
Official Exchange Rate 
(8.57 Colones per U.S. $) 
1.24 
2.39 
2.10 
1.32 
0. 72 
1.19 
1.14 
1. 73 
Exchange Rate Adjusted 40 Percent 
(12.00 Colones per U.S. $) 
0.88 
1.71 
1.50 
0.99 
0.51 
0.85 
0.82 
1.23 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica and U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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IV. Agricultural ~redit 
Commercial banks have long been the predominant source of agricultural cre-
dit in Costa Rica, accounting for two-thirds to three-quarters of agricultural 
lending, with most •lf the rest spread among a variety of informal sources such 
as moneylenders and friends and relatives (Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega). The Costa 
Rican banking syste1n consists of a Central Bank and four commercial banks, all 
of which are owned by the government of Costa Rica, but which operate .. ~ith 
some automony, especially the commercial banks. The most important attributes 
of bank agricultural lending in Costa Rica are the low interest rates set by 
the Central Bank and the limits (both minimum and maximum) that the Central 
Bank sets on the amount of credit to be made available for different activities. 
Throughout mobt of the 1970s, interest rates on bank agricultural loans 
have been set betwt ~n 8 and 11 percent, with the lowest rates on loans for 
small farmers and f)r certain preferred activities such as planting basic 
grains and oilseeds. The main argument for these low interest rates, which 
have even been below the rate of inflation in Costa Rica during several years 
of the 1970s, is that they improve the distribution of income and promote agri-
cultural production in the face of other distortions that place the agricul-
tural sector, and especially small farmers, at a disadvantage (Lizano). How-
ever, bank agricultural loans have been found to be highly concentrated in 
large loans to relatively wealthy farmers, a pattern unlikely to improve the 
distribution of income (Vogel). Moreover, as argued below, the ability of 
low interest rate loans to promote agricultural production is equally unclear. 
Given the impact of the government's price policies on agricultural pro-
duction, there is little indication that bank credit at low interest rates has 
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effectively complemented these price policies or offset any distortions that 
may have been induced. Recent studies of rural financial markets that em-
phasize the fungibility of credit help to explain why this is so (Von Pischke 
and Adams). Because credit is fungible, preferential low interest rates for 
the agricultural sector will fail to redirect resources toward favored activ-
ities in the agricultural sector. Preferential low interest rates do not 
change the prices paid by farmers for inputs or received for output or the 
technologies available to them, and hence the relative profitability of agri-
cultural and non-agricultural activities as well as different activities with-
in the agricultural sector is left unchanged. 
Since credit provides general command over resources, it cannot readily 
be tied to the production of particular goods. Diversion of loans to other 
than the prescribed uses by farmers has been found to be widespread whenever 
audits of credit use have been carried out.~/ Even diligent and costly pro-
grams of credit supervision have failed to eliminate diversion and, in any 
case, are based on the dubious assumption that supervisors know better than 
farmers what farmers should be producing and how they should be producing it. 
More subtle and pervasive than outright diversion is the case in which the 
farmer presents the lender with his most attractive undertaking, one which 
would be carried out even if a loan were not received, and then uses the addi-
tional resources obtained with the loan for some unspecified activity. Such 
behavior is especially likely for relatively wealthy farmers who, as mentioned 
above, obtain the lion's share of bank agricultural credit in Costa Rica and 
often have economic activities outside the agricultural sector. 
The belief that preferential low interest rates on bank agricultural loans 
can promote agricultural production has also diverted attention from the more 
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important fact that bank credit for agriculture has been declining in real 
terms during most ol the 1970s. Measured in nominal terms, bank credit dis-
bursed for the agricultural sector has increased in almost every year during 
the 1970s, but when these figures are corrected for inflation a very differ-
ent picture emerges. For 1977, 1978 and 1979 the real value of new loans to 
the agricultural sector averaged less than 90 percent of what it had been in 
1971 and less than 80 percent of the peak reached in 1974. For only three of 
the twelve agricultural products considered in this study (beef cattle, sor-
ghum and cocoa) was the real volume of bank credit greater at the end of the 
decade than it had been in earlier years. Moreover, the share of bank credit 
going to the agricultural sector had fallen from almost 50 percent at the begin-
ning of the 1970s to less than 40 percent by the second half of the decade. 
The reduction in bank credit for the agricultural sector may in part re-
flect a decrease in the demand for credit due to the adverse trends in agri-
cultural prices after inflation is taken into account. However, the substan-
tial subsidy implicit in low interest bank loans for agriculture and the fact 
that credit is fungible make it difficult to believe that a lack of profitable 
opportunities in the agricultural sector would deter borrowing. A more reason-
able explanation is a reduction in the supply of bank credit for the agricul-
tural sector, in spite of the upper and lower limits that the Central Bank sets 
on lending for different activites. A partial financial reform that was 
initiated in Costa Rica in mid-1978 raised most interest rates substantially 
but left many bank lending rates for agriculture largely unchanged. This new 
interest rate structure has made it unprofitable, if not impossible, for even 
government-owned banks to provide more credit to the agricultural sector, so 
that restricted access to bank credit is likely to continue to plague Costa 
Rican agriculture. 
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V. Conclusions 
Costa Rican a1•ricultural production has tended to stagnate during the 
1970s, especially during the second half of the decade. Adverse government 
price policies for the agricultural sector have contributed substantially to 
this stagnation. Although the prices of most agricultural products have risen 
in nominal terms dt1ring the 1970s, deflating to real prices reveals much lower 
prices for most agricultural products at the end of the decade than in earlier 
years. Government price policies for the agricultural sector have either ig-
nored the reality of inflation or have attempted to combat inflation through 
agricultural price controls, and these have been costly policies in terms of 
agricultural output foregone. 
The government may also have been misled by making inappropriate inter-
national price comparisons based on the official exchange rate, comparisons 
which suggest that Costa Rica is an inefficient and noncompetitive producer 
for many of its main agricultural products. When the official exchange rate 
is adjusted for an overvaluation of at least 40 percent, Costa Rican produ-
cers are shown to be efficient and competitive in a variety of agricultural 
products that are not currently being exported or are even being imported. 
Thus, Costa Rica is not only foregoing agricultural output but is also wast-
ing foreign exchange at a time of large balance of payments deficits. More-
over, government credit policies emphasizing low interest rates on bank agri-
cultural loans have done little or nothing to offset the effects of adverse 
price policies. The main result of such government credit policies has been 
to reduce the flow of bank credit to the agricultural sector in real terms, 
thereby complementing government price policies in their discrimination 
against the agricultural sector. 
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Footnotes 
~/See Balassa and Associates (1Q71) for a full discussion of effective pro-
tection and for estimates of effective protection for several developing 
countries including Brazil and Chile. 
~/The estimate of a 20 percent overvaluation in Costa Rica due to protection 
appears quite modest compared to the estimates of Balassa and Associates 
of 27 percent for Brazil and 68 percent for Chile as of the mid-1960s. 
liThe four commodities excluded are Costa Rica's traditional exports: coffee, 
sugar, bananas and cocoa. 
~/Few of these studies have been published because they are typically carried 
out on a confidential basis by international lending institutions. 
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